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RHETORICAL AND POETICAL THINKING IN LUCAN'S HARANGUES (7.250–382)

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In a rhetorical age, Lucan stood out as rhetorical.[1] Ancient critics identified his work as rhetorical in manner and historical in matter. This is the criticism implied in the discourse of his fictional contemporary, Eumolpus.[2] Quintilian judged him a better model for orators than for poets, implicitly criticizing his confusion of genres.[3] In modern times, while Lucan's supposed historical accuracy has occasionally been the object of misguided praise, rhetoric has frequently been used as a term of abuse—not without reason. That the *Pharsalia* presents a polished and almost impenetrable surface of rhetorical mannerism is undeniable, and it is doubtless this quality that moved Heitland to say of the speeches that "their general characteristic is formality: they are set harangues, without individuality or spontaneousness."[4]

Recently, however, a more tolerant attitude towards rhetoric has led to its acceptance as an element in poetry and so to attempts to define and understand what is rhetorical in Lucan. Morford, for instance, shows how Lucan uses rhetorical technique and, more importantly, rhetorical/declamatory themes for his poetic purposes, and so achieves a reasonable and balanced assessment, which admits Lucan's faults while emphatically maintaining his claim to the title of poet. Several other important studies

[1] I would like to thank Professor Fannie J. LeMoine and Professor Friedrich Solmsen for discussing this paper with me, and one of the anonymous referees for a number of valuable criticisms and suggestions.

[2] Petron. *Sat.* 118. That Eumolpus' opinions are Petronius' is at least doubtful, but to have any point they must reflect some facet of contemporary opinion. Although Eumolpus names no names, the subject of his model poem (a *Bellum Ciuile*) and his demand that an epic poem have *deorum ministeria* are clear allusions to Lucan. The ancient controversy about the genre of the *Pharsalia* is treated in E. M. Sanford, "Lucan and his Roman Critics," *CP* 26 (1931) 233–57.

[3] *Inst.* 10.1.90: *Lucanus ardens et concitatus et sententiis clarissimus et, ut dicam quod sentio, magis oratoribus quam poetis imitandus.*

[4] Introd. to C. E. Haskins' ed. of the *Pharsalia* (London 1887) lxx.

have also concentrated on Lucan's use of declamation themes and rhetorical *exempla* in his *inuentio*.[5]

In this paper I intend to discuss *inuentio* in the speeches of Caesar and Pompey before the battle of Pharsalus.[6] These speeches give us a particularly good opportunity for unravelling the various elements of Lucan's *inuentio*, and for seeing how he uses and alters his material for his poetic ends. By comparing Lucan's speeches with the corresponding speeches in Appian, which, as I shall show, probably reflect a common model, we can see how Lucan adopts and adapts elements that are peculiar to the historical situation. We also can see that some of the elements that Lucan shares with Appian are more general in character, and can be paralleled from other authors. In fact, the genre of the *cohortatio* or formal before-the-battle speech is a popular one in historical writing from the time of Thucydides, and it creates a body of recognizable *cohortatio-topoi*.[7] Some *topoi* that do not occur in Appian appear in Lucan, and even where *topoi* are shared between them, Lucan's use is sometimes better paralleled from some other author. But the real proof that Lucan is actively *using* a convention of which he is very much aware, rather than passively imitating *topoi* out of a model, comes from the allusive way he uses the *topoi*; he expects his audience to be equally aware of the convention. The *cohortationes* of the historians are by no means unrhetorical in general, but the details of this genre lie outside the mainstream of rhetorical education. It would, of course, have to be assigned to the *genus deliberatiuum*, and some of its *topoi* could be classified according to the *partes suadendi* enumerated by Quintilian for this *genus* (3.8.22–35). But this would be artificial; the handbooks give no advice for the *cohortatio*, and the declaimers ignore it.[8] Thus it will be easy to distinguish anything in these

[5] M. P. O. Morford, *The Poet Lucan: Studies in Rhetorical Epic* (Oxford 1967); other good treatments of the same type are Werner Rutz, "Lucan und die Rhetorik," in *Lucain*, Fondation Hardt, Entretiens, vol. 15, ed. M. Durry (Geneva 1968) 235–57, and B. M. Marti, "Cassius Scaeva and Lucan's *Inventio*," *The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan*, ed. L. Wallach (Ithaca 1966) 239–57. The best general treatment of rhetoric (in the narrow sense) in Lucan is S. F. Bonner, "Lucan and the Declamation Schools," *AJP* 87 (1966) 257–89.

[6] For other treatments of these speeches see W. D. Lebek, *Lucans Pharsalia: Dichtungsstruktur und Zeitbezug*, Hypomnemata Heft 44 (Göttingen 1976) 231–38, and W. Tasler, *Die Reden in Lucans Pharsalia* (Bonn 1972) 46–67, 109–19.

[7] The only full-length treatment is Josef Albertus, *Die Παρακλητικοί in der griechischen und römischen Literatur*, Dissertationes Philologicae Argentoratenses Selectae, vol. 13 (Strassburg 1908). There is a short treatment, with a convenient list of *topoi*, in T. C. Burgess, *Epideictic Literature* (Chicago 1902) 209–14, and Gilbert Highet, *The Speeches in Vergil's Aeneid* (Princeton 1972) 82–86, treats the genre's name, history, and relation to rhetorical theory briefly but intelligently. For Thucydides as the founder of the genre, see Albertus 97–99.

[8] Bonner (above, note 5) 285 remarks: "Several of Lucan's speeches take the form of vigorous military harangues, for which there are numerous parallels in the historians, but

speeches that comes from rhetoric in the narrowest sense—the tradition of rhetorical/declamatory education. What we find, as I hope to show, is not just a blending of *topoi* from different sources, but also clear evidence for the profound influence of rhetorical training on Lucan's conception of pathos.

Before going on to the speeches themselves, I must digress briefly to discuss the question of Lucan's model. Our comparative material is unfortunately rather meager. In his *Bellum Civile* (3.90.1–2) Caesar gives a short resume of his speech, concerned with his attempts to negotiate a peace and his regret at the necessity of fighting. Plutarch quotes from Caesar a single sentence: "the wished-for day has come at last, when you can fight with men, and not with famine and want" (*Pomp.* 68.6). The only historian to give a full-scale speech to Caesar—and another to Pompey—is Appian (*BC* 2.72–74). There are a number of thematic resemblances between Appian's speech for Caesar and Lucan's, and perhaps a few between their speeches for Pompey. The most striking resemblance comes at the end of Caesar's speech, where in both authors he orders his men to destroy the fortifications of their camp before the battle. There is no historical basis for this command; Appian, in fact, notes the discrepancy with Caesar's own account that he left a guard in the camp. It has been suggested as more likely that Lucan invented this melodramatic motif, and that Appian was following him, than that it was already circulating in Lucan's day in the guise of history.[9] Appian's speech for Caesar, however, begins with the same contrast between men on the one hand and famine and want on the other that we saw in Plutarch; it is thus probable that they share a model. This model cannot be Lucan, because he does not use this motif, though he does use the wished-for-day *topos*, which occurs in Plutarch, but not in Appian. And Lucan, after all, had no monopoly on melodrama. The simplest hypothesis is that Appian depends on this model throughout and that the parallels in Lucan reflect common borrowings. Another consideration points to the same

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not in the Senecan declamations." Quintilian mentions the value of rhetorical training for the purpose of haranguing the troops, but only in his highly idealized discussion of the Perfect Orator (12.1.28). Generals' speeches do seem to have played a role in Greek προγυμνάσματα: Hermogenes (Spengel II, 15) gives as an example of ἠθοποιία the address of a general *after* a battle, and Theon (Spengel II, 115) as a προσωποποιία, a true *cohortatio*.

[9] B. Perrin, "Lucan as Historical Source for Appian," *AJP* 5 (1884) 325–30. Of recent commentators on book 7 (at 7.326), O. A. W. Dilke (Cambridge 1960) thinks the dependence of Appian on Lucan unlikely, while Donato Gagliardi (Florence 1975) thinks it unquestionable. The idea is not as absurd as it sounds; it is the natural corollary to the ancient view that Lucan wrote versified history rather than poetry. For other possible uses of Lucan as an historical source, see E. Westerburg, "Lucan, Florus und Pseudo-Victor," *RhM* 37 (1882) 35–49. Whatever the value of his ideas about Florus, his explanation of an oddity in the *de Vir. Ill.* as a misunderstanding of Lucan is quite convincing.

conclusion. We must account for the lack of resemblance between the two authors' speeches for Pompey. In Appian, the divergence would be unaccountable; in Lucan, the reasons are obvious: the course of Pompey's speech is largely determined by Lucan's desire to make it parallel to Caesar's and to characterize Pompey as a loser.

The tone of Lucan's two speeches is determined by the situation as he depicts it in the beginning of the seventh book. Pompey is unwilling to risk a battle, but his men are eager, and Cicero urges him to fight. Pompey acquiesces fatalistically, but expresses in a long speech (87–123) his reasons for deprecating a pitched battle and his total dispair of the outcome. Immediately afterward he prepares for battle. So critical is the situation that even Caesar, who has been waiting for just such an opportunity, is assailed by uncharacteristic last-minute doubts, but he is able to suppress them and deliver a rousing harangue to his men. Pompey's reaction to the coming battle is even stronger: he is struck cold with fear, yet he too is able to suppress his feelings enough to deliver a somewhat shorter speech. Here, as Tasler says, the superficial similarity underlines the essential difference between Caesar's momentary hesitation and Pompey's profound despair.[10] This is an anticipation of the speeches themselves. Caesar's speech is longer, less well organized, but considerably more emotional and extravagant; yet the two speeches show striking thematic parallels. The difference in tone and length gives Pompey's speech an anticlimatic effect. Here what is sometimes a vice in Lucan's style is quite deliberate. In the second book Pompey delivers a rousing harangue (531–95), only to be met with chilling silence and the necessity of retreating before Caesar's advance; now, at the very hour of battle, his whole speech comes as an anticlimax. The parallelism between the speeches encourages comparison and so serves to accentuate the contrast between them.[11]

In Lucan, both Caesar and Pompey begin with the wished-for-day *topos* that we saw in Plutarch. This may have been traditional for Caesar's Pharsalus-speech (though Appian does not have it); Lucan gives it to Pompey as well, to emphasize from the beginning the parallelism of the two speeches. At the same time, he adapts the *topos* to his two characters. Pompey begins:

[10] Tasler (above, note 6) 109.

[11] The technique of writing the *cohortatio* of one side as if it were the answer to that of the other goes back to Thucydides: 2.87 and 89 (Rhium), 4.92 and 95 (Delium), 7.61–64 and 66–68 (Bay of Syracuse). R. Faust, *De Lucani Orationibus: Pars I Pharsaliae Librorum I. II. III. Orationes Continens* (Regimontani 1908: part II was apparently never published) 45, concludes that the *cohortationes* of Caesar at Ariminum (1.299–351) and Pompey at Capua (2.531–95) were consciously written as a corresponding pair. For a very thorough and perceptive comparison of the speeches of Caesar and Pompey, see Tasler's analysis of the latter (pp. 109–19).

quem flagitat, inquit,
uestra diem uirtus, finis ciuilibus armis,
quem quaesistis, adest (342–44).

This use of the wished-for-day *topos* is on the surface conventional enough, but the insistent repetition and the strong word *flagitat* remind us, as Tasler points out, that Pompey does *not* want to fight.[12] Yet this ironic double meaning is not pressed, and Pompey links this *topos* with another, the promise that the battle will bring rest from labor—in this case the evils of civil war.[13] He continues with the exhortation, *totas effundite uires*, and a brief statement of the importance of the battle,[14] *extremum ferri superest opus, unaque gentis / hora trahit*, expanded by a tightly packed appeal to home and family:

quisquis patriam carosque penates,
qui subolem ac thalamos desertaque pignora quaerit,
ense petat: medio posuit deus omnia campo.

The mention of the gods then provides the transition to the next point: *causa iubet melior superos sperare secundos.*

The statement of the importance of the battle is found in Appian's speech for Caesar in the simplest possible form: ἥδε δὲ ἡ ἡμέρα κρινεῖ πάντα (*BC* 2.73), but it is linked with none of the other *topoi* we find here, all of which are easily paralleled in literary *cohortationes*, and are evidently part of Lucan's inherited stock of appropriate *topoi*. The wished-for-day *topos* is by no means confined to Pharsalus; there is a close parallel in Livy's Cato: *tempus, inquit, quod saepe optastis, uenit, quo uobis potestas fieret uirtutem uestram ostendendi* (34.13.5). This *topos* and that of rest from labors are combined in one of Seneca's *Suasoriae*, in what might be called an "anti-cohortatio": *uenit ille dies, Alexander, exoptatus, quo tibi opera desset* (1.2). The *topos "pro aris atque focis"* is a natural one;[15] we find exactly the same pattern—emotional appeal followed by a general statement that all is at stake—in Aeschylus' *Persae*:

ὦ παῖδες Ἑλλήνων, ἴτε
ἐλευθεροῦτε πατρίδ', ἐλευθεροῦτε δὲ
παῖδας γυναῖκας θεῶν τε πατρῴων ἕδη
θήκας τε προγόνων· νῦν ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀγών (402–5).

[12] Tasler (above, note 6) 111.

[13] For examples of this *topos*, see Albertus (above, note 7) 67: Polyb. 3.111.9 and Livy 21.43.10 are particularly apt.

[14] See Albertus 63; e.g., Thuc. 2.89.10.

[15] For other examples, see Albertus 65–67; the quote is from Sall. *Cat.* 59.5. The *topos* is already identified as an old saw by Thucydides (7.69.2).

But Lucan's phrase *medio posuit deus omnia campo* suggests also that the gods have set these things out as prizes. This sequence of ideas—the battle is a contest, the gods are the umpires, they will favor the righteous side[16] —is closely paralleled by a passage in Xenophon's *Anabasis*:

> ἐν μέσῳ γὰρ ἤδη κεῖται ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἆθλα ὁπότεροι ἂν ἡμῶν ἄνδρες ἀμείνονες ὦσιν, ἀγωνοθέται δ' οἱ θεοί εἰσιν, οἳ σὺν ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἔσονται. οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐπιωρκήκασιν (3.1.21).

Caesar's speech begins:

> o domitor mundi, rerum fortuna mearum,
> miles, adest totiens optatae copia pugnae.
> nil opus est uotis, iam fatum accersite ferro.
> in manibus uestris, quantus sit Caesar, habetis (250–53).

In this version, the *topos* takes on a somewhat different flavor; it is the battle itself that is desired, with no suggestion that it is being fought for peace. It is no accident that Caesar sounds like the bellicose Turnus: *quod uotis optastis adest, perfringere dextra* (*Aen.* 10.279). The exhortation to fight that follows is expected, but its expression is impious, implying that the gods are powerless and man the author of his own destiny. This foreshadows an important theme in this pair of speeches. Caesar too wants to show why the battle is important, and his statement is typically egotistical. All through his speech Caesar's declarations of selflessness alternate with revelations of egotism.[17] At the same time, this unexpected personal reference is reminiscent of one of the *loci misericordiae* of the manual *Ad Herennium* in which *supplicabimus et nos sub eorum quorum misericordiam captabimus postestatem subiciemus* (2.31.50). This too is a hint of the future course of Caesar's speech.

In the following lines (254–56) Caesar reminds his men of the oath they swore to him at the Rubicon, and of the wrong done to them by those who refused him a triumph for his Gallic victories. These two appeals, traditional in type though particular in detail, are also found in Appian, where they come, as here, directly after the initial statement of the importance of the battle.[18] Lucan compresses into three allusive lines what fills some nine Teubner lines of circumstantial detail in Appian. Appian's

[16] For other examples, see Albertus 60–61.

[17] Caesar's hyprocrisy is treated more fully by Lebek (above, note 6) 233–34. He especially stresses his misuse of *libertas* in contrast with Pompey's sincerity. Tasler (above, note 6) is especially acute in cataloguing the internal inconsistencies of Caesar's speech (see esp. pp. 66–67).

[18] Appian's Caesar, however, puts the oath at Dyrrhachium. For the motif, compare the indignant Nestor (*Il.* 2.339): πῇ δὴ συνθεσίαι τε καὶ ὅρκια βήσεται ἡμιν; "The wrongs suffered from this enemy" is Burgess's 10th *topos* (above, note 7).

Caesar goes on to emphasize the wrongs he and his men have suffered; Lucan's Caesar also goes on to talk about justice, but in a very different way.

We have seen how Pompey introduces the argument that the gods will favor the just side; he reinforces it with a short hyperbole (350–51) and a complacent proof: if the gods did not favor the senatorial party, they would not have preserved Pompey to be its general. If this seems pompous and foolish, it is probably meant to. It fits with Lucan's characterization of Pompey as the superannuated, self-important tool of the senatorial party. But more important, the whole argument about divine favor, conventional as it is in Pompey's mouth, is profoundly ironic from Lucan's pen. Consider the same theme as treated by Caesar (259–63). Pompey said that the just cause would enjoy divine favor; Caesar says that if they win, their cause will become just. The idea that victory is the seal of divine favor is of course very widespread; the scholiast, for instance, quotes the words of Cicero spoken before the victorious Caesar: *nunc melior ea iudicanda est, quam etiam di adiuuerunt.*[19] We may expect a similar argument from Lucan's Caesar when he begins *haec [est illa dies], fato quae teste probet, quis iustius arma / sumpserit* (259–60). But Lucan's Caesar believes that might makes right, and the point is driven home in the three *sententiae* that follow: *haec acies uictum factura nocentem est, nunc pugnate truces gladioque exsoluite culpam*, and, with its cynical condition, *nulla manus, belli mutato iudice, pura est.*[20]

For Lucan, the tragedy is that Caesar's cynicism is quite justified. We have long been prepared, not only for the outcome of the conflict (which of course we already know), but also for Lucan's interpretation of it. The phrase *quis iustius arma sumpserit* refers us to the famous *sententia* in the first book:

> quis iustius induit arma
> scire nefas: magno se iudice quisque tuetur;
> uictrix causa deis placuit sed uicta Catoni (126–28).

This is bitterly ironical. In its position it wears a thin mask of impartiality, but a comparison of Lucan's treatment of the gods and of Cato makes it clear whose judgment he trusts. Cato is a paradigm of stoic virtue; the gods for the most part are contemptuously ignored. Events prove that the world is ruled by blind fate, a hideous parody of the stoic Providence:[21]

[19] Cic. *Lig.* 19; quoted by the *Schol. Bern.* at 7.259.

[20] This typical trick of emphasizing a point by piling up tautological *sententiae* is wittily mocked by Fronto in reference to the opening lines of the *Pharsalia*. He begins *is initio carminis sui septem primis uersibus nihil aliud quam 'bella plus quam ciuilia' interpretatus est* (*Ep. ad M. Antoninum de oratoribus* 7 [Naber 157–58; van den Hout 151]).

[21] For Lucan's ambivalent relation to stoic thought, see H. A. Schotes, *Stoische Physik, Psychologie und Theologie bei Lucan* (Bonn 1969), especially the summary, 167–75. He

sunt nobis nulla profecto
numina: cum caeco rapiantur saecula casu,
mentimur regnare Iouem (7.445–47).

In this pair of arguments the conventional theme—the relation of victory to divine favor—serves a poetic purpose. The way in which the two men use the material reflects their characters. Pompey, pious and self-important, reinforces a conventional argument with a rather suspicious proof; Caesar impiously turns the argument on its head. This paradox—that the better argument is the worse and the worse the better—reflects a theme that runs through all of Lucan's poem, the malevolent irrationality of events.[22]

This analysis will also allow us to understand the next argument in Pompey's speech, that theirs is the side taken by all the best Romans, past and present. That the presence, moral and physical, of consuls and senators clearly identifies the right side is a commonplace of Roman historical writing; they are both a reason for fighting on that side and a guarantee of victory.[23] Appian's Pompey similarly makes the presence of leading senators and knights a sign that their cause is just. Here again a common source may have suggested this *topos* to Lucan, but this argument was also prominent in Pompey's earlier, unsuccessful harangue:

hinc consul uterque,
hinc acies statura ducum est. Caesarne senatus
uictor erit? non tam caeco trahis omnia cursu
teque nihil, Fortuna, pudet (2.565–68).

The ironic apostrophe to Fortune puts the answer to Pompey's rhetorical question beyond doubt. Fortune is, in Lucan's poem, both shameless and blind; she neither knows nor cares on which side the consuls are.

Although in fact this last argument of Pompey's is more closely related to the religious one which preceded it (they would both fit under the rubric *pium*), he puts it under the heading *facile—quae uincere possent / omnia contulimus* (355–56)—and goes on, by way of contrast, to mention the many non-Roman forces on his side and so to show the great superiority of his army. This *comparatio uirium* corresponds to a similar passage in Caesar's speech (269–94). Caesar begins by stating his point: *nec sanguine multo / spem mundi petitis*. The opponents are Greek

points out that in natural history, for instance, Lucan believes in a beneficent Providence, but in relation to men, *fatum* (and its equivalents *dei* and *fortuna*) is evil: "was Caesar im menschlichen, das ist Fatum im übermenschlichen Bereich: Hypostasierung des Bösen" (169).

[22] I paraphrase K. Seitz, "Der pathetische Erzählstil Lucans," *Hermes* 93 (1965) 204–32, who speaks of Lucan's "leidenschaftlicher Empörung und ohnmächtiger Klage über das Verbrecherische und Widersinnige der Ereignisse" (220).

[23] See Albertus (above, note 7) 91–92.

boys—not even good at wrestling, let alone fighting—and a motley throng of babbling barbarians, who will not even be able to bear the sound of their own yelling (*clamor*, 274); there may be a lot of them, but they will be easily destroyed. All these points are made in a full and ornamented style, pointed with *emphasis* (*ciuilia paucae / bella manus facient*, 274–75) and *hyperbole* (*pugnae pars magna leuabit / his orbem populis*, 275–76).[24] Moreover, he continues, Pompey's allies have no stake in his success and, while they hate Roman rule in general, they hate most of all the master they already know (281–85). The second half of the *comparatio*, in which he evaluates his own men, follows a conventional theme. He can personally bear witness to the valor of his men and knows them all by name: *cuius non militis ensem / agnoscam*? (287–88). Hannibal in Livy provides a close parallel: *non ego illud parui aestimo, milites, quod nemo est uestrum, . . . cui non idem ego uirtutis spectator ac testis notata temporibus locisque referre sua possim decora* (21.43.17).[25] What follows in Caesar's speech is merely an *amplificatio* of his confidence in victory (293–94).

The *comparatio uirium* as an element of the formal *cohortatio* goes back to (and has its most analytical expression in) Thucydides, and so has a long history. Albertus lists five *topoi*, of which Caesar uses three: our training will beat their numbers; the enemy are barbarians, and so particularly easy to beat (this *topos* is properly a variation of the previous one); the enemy's soldiers are disloyal.[26] The *locus de barbaris* is found already in Thucydides:

> οὗτοι δὲ τὴν μέλλησιν μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἀπείροις φοβεράν· καὶ γὰρ πλήθει ὄψεως δεινοὶ καὶ βοῆς μεγέθει ἀφόρητοι, ἥ τε διὰ κενῆς ἐπανάσεισις τῶν ὅπλων ἔχει τινὰ δήλωσιν ἀπειλῆς. . . . (4.126.5).

Livy treats the same theme in much the same way (38.17). Manlius, before a battle with the Galatians, dwells on the immense size of the warriors, their strange and savage weapons, their fierce shouting and dancing, only to dismiss these as *uanitates*; he also expatiates on eastern degeneracy. Lucan's Caesar follows the tradition quite closely, stressing especially the great size of the enemy host and their yelling, only to dismiss these as empty show; the argument that no more could be expected from Greeks and orientals is clearly implied.

Appian also gives a *comparatio uirium* to both generals. His Caesar says that Pompey's men are inexperienced and undisciplined (his use of

[24] This is perhaps a reminiscence of Zeus's plan, as reported in the *Cypria* (fr. 1, Allen), to relieve over-population by fostering wars.

[25] See Albertus 72–74.

[26] See Albertus 82–86.

μειρακιωδῶς in this connection, along with Pompey's description of them as νέοι, may reflect the inspiration for Lucan 270–72), and that Pompey is fearful, unwilling and overcautious; as for the allies, they are eastern slaves, whom not even Pompey trusts, and, though they run about and clamor (θορυβοποιεῖν) like dogs, they may be safely ignored. The similarities are consistent with the hypothesis that both versions go back to a common model, but if we may take Appian as a guide, Lucan has added, subtracted, and rearranged material. In Appian the size and noise of the barbarian horde is only alluded to briefly at the end of the section; Lucan expands the whole *topos* in a more conventional way and puts it much earlier in the comparison. He adds self-interest to cowardice as a reason for thinking that the allies will not fight hard. He says nothing of Pompey's state of mind, but adds a traditional *topos* about Caesar's trust in his own men.

Now consider Pompey's *comparatio uirium* (360–68). Here the importance of identifying the *locus de barbaris* as a traditional one becomes plain; it is only in this wider context that Pompey's use of the *topos* gains its ironic significance. The vast size and eastern origin of the army is first stated and then epigrammatically summed up: *toto simul utimur orbe*. Pompey elaborates on their numbers, concluding with another hyperbolical epigram, *paucas uictoria dextras / exigit*, and then—as if to seal his fate—*at plures tantum clamore cateruae / bella gerent: Caesar nostris non sufficit armis*. One cannot misuse traditional *topoi* in this way and expect to win battles. Pompey is of course expected to put the best face on things that he can, despite his own lack of confidence. But if we are aware of the tradition, Pompey's speech is not in the least reassuring. Lucan could surely have devised a better argument. We may contrast Appian's Pompey. He does mention their numerical superiority, but with not a hint about the allies; he continues with the *topos*, both conventional and apt, "we have beaten this enemy before,"[27] and the *ad hoc* arguments that Caesar's men are old and worn out with long service. The purely rhetorical mind would revel in finding good arguments for the losing side; here Lucan the poet stands revealed. The mistake in words is symbolic of the more important failure; the words take on their full meaning in a wider context than the speech itself.

An example of exactly the same symbolism, dependent on the reader's knowledge of the historical *topos*, occurs in the *Aeneid*. Juturna, in her *cohortatio* to the Latins in the twelfth book says *uix hostem, alterni si congrediamur, habemus* (233).[28] Vergil is not an insistent author, and the

[27] *BC* 2.72. For other examples, see Albertus 78–79.

[28] Highet (above, note 7) 309 suggests that this line was inspired by *Il.* 2.123–28. The context, however, is different; Agamemnon uses their numerical superiority to shame his men rather than to encourage them.

implication of this line is easy to miss; nevertheless, the false argument marks the losing side.

Pompey has badly mauled the conventions of a practical *topos*, the *comparatio uirium*; Caesar has perverted an ethical *topos*, concerned with the relation of justice and victory. Again towards the end of his speech Caesar, beginning from a conventional *topos*, ends up by perverting it. He prays to the gods that the side that has treated its enemy more humanely may win:

> uincat quicumque necesse
> non putat in uictos saeuum destringere ferrum
> quique suos ciues, quod signa aduersa tulerunt,
> non credit fecisse nefas (312–15).

Caesar himself reports that he reminded his men of his vain efforts to make peace, and in Appian he is made to contrast the injustices done him with his own forbearance: ἴστε οὓς μεθῆκα ἀπαθεῖς, ἐλπίσας ἡμῖν τι παρ' αὐτῶν ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον (*BC* 2.73). This is a variation on the theme "look what we did for them;" we may compare Scipio in Livy: *ueniam dedimus precantibus, emisimus ex obsidione, pacem cum uictis fecimus, tutelae deinde nostrae duximus, cum Africo bello urgerentur* (21.41.12). In a brilliant move, Lucan shifts the argument from Caesar's forbearance before the battle to his anticipated clemency during and after it. In this way Lucan introduces the theme of Caesar's *clementia*, which he develops by adapting the two contradictory sayings of Caesar on the field of Pharsalus: *miles, faciem feri* and *parce ciuibus*.[29] Lucan may not have been the first to include the latter in Caesar's speech: Appian's Caesar, just before the final order to destroy the camp, says: τρεψάμενοι δ' αὐτοὺς τῶνδε μὲν ὡς συγγενῶν φειδώμεθα, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους ἐς τὴν τῶνδε κατάπληξιν ἐξεργάσασθε (*BC* 2.74). Lucan, however, uses both, and exaggerates the contrast between them. The latter, following directly out of the *locus de clementia*, becomes a command to spare all who flee: *ciuis qui fugerit esto* (319). But this leads to the other side of the coin, and the order "strike at their faces" becomes an exhortation to ignore *pietas* completely:

> sed, dum tela micant, non uos pietatis imago
> ulla nec aduersa conspecti fronte parentes
> commoueant; uoltus gladio turbate uerendos. . . . (320–22).

Caesar has already disposed of religious *pietas*; he is much more direct about familial *pietas*. Once again the proper relation of virtue and victory

[29] Florus *Epit.* 2.13.50. The *Schol.Bern.* (at 7.318) quotes the latter in the form *parce fugienti*, but the passage of Lucan he is annotating has apparently led him astray, as the other ancient sources support Florus' version (Suet. *Iul.* 75.2; Appian *BC* 2.80; Polyaenus *Strat.* 8.23.29).

is reversed. The strange thing, however, about this passage is that the rejection of *pietas* grows out of an exhortation to *clementia*. Here again Lucan is touching on a theme that is central to his work. For Lucan, Caesar's *clementia* is not a virtue; to be forgiven by Caesar is the worst punishment:

> poenarum extremum ciui, quod castra secutus
> sit patriae Magnumque ducem totumque senatum,
> ignosci (2.519–21).

Pietas is never even claimed on the Caesarian side, and is vigorously repudiated or perverted by Caesar's followers. In the first book one of his centurions, Laelius, delivers a blood-curdling speech in which he rejects all the elements of conventional *pietas* with methodical blasphemy (359–86); others, such as Vulteius and Scaeva, can show only a savage *militiae pietas* (4.499);[30] truly, the civil war is the story of *pietas peritura* (2.63).

It is the rejection of *pietas* that perverts *clementia*, by depriving it of its proper motive. This point becomes clear in the scene in which Caesar is presented with Pompey's head. His hypocritical reaction is described; Lucan speculates at some length about the exact nature of his feelings, but concludes: *quisquis te flere coegit / impetus, a uera longe pietate recessit* (9.1055–56). Lucan then meditates, in the form of an apostrophe to Caesar, on Pompey's good fortune in escaping his pity:

> quam magna remisit
> crimina Romano tristis fortuna pudori,
> quod te non passa est misereri, perfide, Magni
> uiuentis! (9.1059–62)

Although in the preceding section Lucan suggested that Caesar may have contemplated taking personal vengeance on Pompey, he does not generally deny the reality of Caesar's *clementia*, and here too *misereri* implies a real pardon. The point is that in the absence of true *pietas*, *clementia* is a mockery. So in Caesar's *cohortatio* the rejection of *pietas* hints at the perverse nature of the *clementia* that immediately precedes it. Beginning with a conventional *topos* and expanding it with material from the historical tradition about Caesar, Lucan has touched on another major theme of his poem.

Thus far we have been concerned with traditional *topoi*. What in these two speeches represents Lucan's own addition? The situation is clearer in Pompey's shorter and more orderly speech. He begins the last part of it (369–76) by returning to a *topos* he has already used—the pious motives of fighting for family, for senate, and for Rome herself. But the contrast

[30] For the theme of *militiae pietas*, see F. M. Ahl, *Lucan: An Introduction* (Ithaca 1976) 117–21, 149, 201.

with lines 346–48 is striking. There country, gods, children, wives, and friends were reasons for a man to fight—*ense petat*—just as they were in Aeschylus. Here the same theme is infused with a pathos that seems to undercut its very purpose.[31] The scene is brought so vividly before us that the imminence of disaster distracts us from the hope of averting it. This effect is achieved by the use of the figure *enargeia* or "vivid description." *Haec exornatio plurimum prodest in amplificanda et commiseranda re*, says the author of the *Ad Herennium* (4.55.69), and Quintilian advises *ubi uero miseratione opus erit, nobis ea, de quibus queremur, accidisse credamus atque id animo nostro persuadeamus* (6.2.34). One of the stock examples of *enargeia* is the *captae urbis miseratio*, and it would not be far-fetched to detect its influence here. Pity is certainly the emotion that it is meant to arouse.[32]

So far the appeal to pity has at least been built upon an ancient *cohortatio-topos*; it leads, however, to something still odder—a personal appeal on behalf of Pompey himself, his wife and sons:

> siquis post pignora tanta
> Pompeio locus est, cum prole et coniuge supplex,
> imperii salua si maiestate liceret,
> uoluerer ante pedes. Magnus, nisi uincitis, exul,
> ludibrium soceri, uester pudor, ultima fata
> deprecor ac turpes extremi cardinis annos,
> ne discam seruire senex (376–82).

Odder yet, Lucan maintains the parallelism of the two speeches by giving Caesar a similar appeal, more emotional and bizarre than Pompey's, and clearly meant to steal his thunder:

> aut merces hodie bellorum aut poena parata.
> Caesareas spectate cruces, spectate catenas,
> et caput hoc positum rostris effusaque membra
> Saeptorumque nefas et clausi proelia Campi.
> cum duce Sullano gerimus ciuilia bella.
> uestri cura mouet; nam me secura manebit

[31] Tasler (above, note 6) 117 remarks on the inappropriateness of "eine so flehentliche Gebärde" to Pompey as commander-in-chief.

[32] This figure is generally called, in Greek, ἐνάργεια or ὑποτύπωσις; there is no agreement on the Latin translation. The *ad Her.* distinguishes *descriptio* (4.39.51), the vivid description of hypothetical events, from *demonstratio* (4.55.68), of things that have actually happened. Quintilian treats the figure in a number of places with copious examples and a generous selection of terminology: (4.2.123–24) *credibilis imago rerum*—the example is aimed at *indignatio*; (6.2.32–36) *illustratio, evidentia*; (8.3.61–71) *evidentia, repraesentatio*; (9.2.40–44) *sub oculis subiectio.*

The *captae urbis miseratio* is used as an example at Quint. 8.3.67–69 and *ad Her.* 4.39.51, where Caplan gives further examples.

sor quaesita manu: fodientem uiscera cernet
me mea qui nondum uicto respexerit hoste (303–10).

There are, however, striking differences between the two. The self-defeating pathos of Pompey's *enargeia* has already been noted; the same disheartened tone continues through his personal appeal. He seems already in despair; the parenthetical condition *nisi uincitis* does little to lighten the picture of defeat and degradation, and our impression is confirmed when we learn that he speaks *maesta uoce* (382–83). The despair of Pompey's ending is especially clear if we compare it with the end of Caesar's speech, where, as in Appian, he confidently orders his men to destroy their camp, since they will sleep that night in Pompey's. At the same time, Pompey's fear of slavery is unheroic beside the alternative of death and mutilation, or suicide, that Caesar describes so vividly.[33] In Caesar's speech we also see again the tension between essential egotism and assumed selflessness. The *Caesareae cruces* are ambiguous, since they could be crosses for Caesarians or for Caesar himself; the next line is concerned only with his treatment, while the allusion to Sulla's massacre of the Samnite prisoners suggests a general slaughter of Caesarians. With the phrase *uestri cura mouet* he moves into an entirely self-centered plea. Again Lucan uses the parallelism of the two speeches to contrast the speakers.

But why this appeal at all? Where did Lucan get the idea in the first place? Not from the historical tradition. Nothing like this is found elsewhere, to my knowledge, in a *cohortatio* except in the most rudimentary form, and then in poetry. Pallas, in the *Aeneid* (10.369–71), appeals to his fleeing men by their former bravery, his father's name, their successful campaigns, and his own hopes. This is hardly comparable with the present examples.

There is one place, however, where such an appeal is perfectly at home—the peroration of a judicial speech. In rhetorical theory the *conclusio* has only three possible elements: *enumeratio*, *indignatio* (*amplificatio*), and *conquestio* (*commiseratio* or *miseratio*).[34] Pompey makes special use in his *miseratio* of Cicero's *quartus* [*locus conquestionis*], *per quem res turpes et humiles et illiberales proferuntur et indigna esse aetate, genere, fortuna pristina, honore, beneficiis quae passi perpessuriue sint* (*de Inv.* 1.55.107). Even the rather stuffy way in which Pompey says that he would throw himself at their feet, if it were consonant with the dignity of his position, follows exactly Cicero's advice that dignity should be maintained, *nam saepe uirtus et magnificentia, in quo grauitas et auctoritas est, plus proficit ad misericordiam*

[33] Ahl (above, note 30) 164–65 emphasizes this contrast.

[34] Cic. *de Inv.* 1.52.98; alternate forms are from *ad Her.* 2.30.47; *miseratio* is Quintilian's usual term (e.g., 6.1.9).

commouendam, quam humilitas et obsecratio (*de Inv.* 1.56.109). The appeal on behalf of wife and children is also suggested by rhetorical theory (as well as courtroom practice), although Pompey does not make use of the whole *locus per quem non nostras, sed eorum qui cari nobis debent esse fortunas conqueri nos demonstramus* (*de Inv.* 1.56.109).

Caesar, on the other hand, makes full use of this *topos*: *uestri cura mouet; nam me secura manebit / sors quaesita manu* (308–09). The most striking thing, however, in his appeal is the use of *enargeia*. Two pathetic scenes are described, both in emphatically visual terms. The author of the *Ad Herennium* calls this sort of *enargeia*, in which the possible outcome of an action is vividly described, *descriptio*, and he says that by it *uel indignatio uel misericordia potest commoueri* (4.39.51). Caesar uses the figure for both these ends. In the *descriptiones* themselves the two elements are difficult to distinguish, but the first one seems to be more slanted towards arousing *indignatio*, which is reinforced by the reference to Sulla that follows it, and the second, introduced by his claim to care nothing for himself, towards *miseratio*.

In the first part of the last section of Pompey's speech we saw that the conventional *cohortatio-topos* was overlaid with a form—*enargeia*—and a pathetic tone—*miseratio*—that clearly came as a unit from rhetorical theory. For the personal appeal that followed there was no model in the genre of the *cohortatio*, but rhetorical theory provided both a model for ending a speech with *miseratio* and the techniques by which this was done. That this was, in fact, the inspiration for the *miseratio* is, finally, confirmed by the juxtaposition of *miseratio* and *indignatio* in Caesar's speech. These are the rhetorical emotions κατ' ἐξοχήν. When Quintilian treats the elements of the *conclusio*, he combines *indignatio* and *miseratio* under the rubric "the appeal to emotion" (6.1.1–8). The narrowness of the rhetorical definition of pathos is stated most baldly by Macrobius: *oportet enim ut oratio pathetica aut ad indignationem aut ad misericordiam dirigatur, quae a Graecis οἶκτος καὶ δείνωσις appellantur. horum alterum accusatori necessarium est, alterum reo* (*Sat.* 4.2.1).

K. Seitz has shown how large a part rhetorical ideas play in Lucan's pathos.[35] One aspect of this pathos is the sustained exaggeration of tone that is so immediately obvious, but another major element is one particular pathos: *indignatio*. Seitz points to the rhetorical background of this pathos and shows how Lucan's treatment of several scenes differs from Vergil's *empathetic* treatment. This is a very important insight, but it should not cause us to ignore Lucan's use of *miseratio*, which confirms the identification of his *indignatio* as a rhetorical pathos.

Biography suggests that *indignatio* was the ruling passion of Lucan's life, and we may guess that one of his reasons for turning to rhetorical

[35] In the article cited above, note 22.

epic was its applicability to his view of the world. But whatever combination of inclination and education turned Lucan toward rhetorical epic, rhetorical pathos in turn molded his epic. Caesar's use of *indignatio* is perfectly natural, but it is only in judicial oratory that the natural complement of *indignatio* directed against one's opponent is *miseratio* directed towards oneself. Caesar speaks as if he were before judges rather than soldiers. Pompey uses only *miseratio*, directed first towards others, and then towards himself—for all the world like a defendant with a bad case. Inappropriate as this is to the situation, it expresses Lucan's view of Pompey's passive and disheartened spirit, and again underlines the inevitability of his defeat.

Because Lucan works so hard on the surface of his poem, it is easy to dismiss him as superficial. This is not entirely fair to him. In these two speeches we have seen how he adapts traditional material to create strongly contrasting speeches for his two main characters, and at the same time gives these speeches a deeper meaning in the wider context of his poem. By choosing a genre for which there are a reasonable number of models, but no generally applicable rhetorical theory, we have been able to isolate the major element of *inuentio* that could not go back to historical models—the appeal to pity—and this is clearly adapted from rhetorical theory. This result in turn strongly supports Seitz's conclusion that Lucan's pathos is essentially rhetorical; that is, that whatever its psychological springs, it is strongly molded by his rhetorical training.